We have developed two methodologies to analyze and model normal payloads that are expected to be delivered to network services or applications: PAYL, which implements anomaly detection based on frequency-based 1-gram modeling, and Anagram, which uses binary-based mixtures of higher order n-gram modeling (n > 1). Both sensors train on normal unencrypted content flows and employ service-specific models to test for suspicious traffic. 1 Alerts are generated on traffic sufficiently deviant from normal; it is these alerts that we wish to share with other sites to resolve false positives from true zero-day attacks.
N-gram signature. We can generate a list of n-grams that are found to be suspicious from an originating packet. Such a "signature" is position-independent while capturing specific malicious byte sequences. Given two n-gram signatures, we can simply compute the intersection of the two and threshold the cardinality of the intersected set to determine a similarity score. Such an intersection is linear time in the length of the signatures by using fast set-based data structures; depending on the n-gram size and packet content, this can vary significantly; while most packets are regular and have few n-grams, encrypted traffic, with a very flat byte distribution, can have as many n-grams as the size of the packet itself. In either case, an n-gram signature is a degenerate form of a raw packet; when distributing large n-grams, this is clearly not privacy-preserving, as even a 5-gram can contain a password. In these cases, we need a transformation on the n-gram itself.
Bloom filter n-gram signature. Instead of publishing an n-gram signature, we can instead insert the n-grams into a Bloom filter and publish it. 2 Since Bloom filters support both insert and verify, set intersections can be done between a (local) "raw" n-gram signature and a published BF n-gram signature, identifying the same n-grams as the previous technique without yielding other, potentially sensitive n-grams. This approach is also linear in time but leverages a BF's space efficiency. Optionally, multiple alerts can be published via a single Bloom filter, treating the BF as a bag of suspicious n-grams. This enables a multiplicative reduction in the amount of data transmitted and work needed to compute intersections.
Incidentally, correlating two BF n-gram signatures from different sites can be done via a bitwise AND "intersection"; this does not yield actual n-gram content, but may help find commonality between signatures, increasing confidence that the correct common code has been found when correlated against local data. BF intersection can also be used for model comparison, e.g., comparing two Anagram models to see if different sites exhibit similar traffic properties.
Results
Similarity Score As discussed in section 1.2, we compute a set of similarity scores for every correlation technique, 0 ≤ score ≤ 1, with a higher score implying a more similar pair of alerts.
Raw packets and Z-Strings. For both of these alert types, our basket of string comparisons can be used. For SE, the score is binary: 0 or 1, where 1 means equality. For LCS and LCSeq, we use the percentage of the common LCS or LCSeq length out of the total length of candidate strings: score = 2 * C/(L 1 + L 2 ), where C is the length of LCS/LCSeq and L i is the length of string i. For ED, larger values imply dissimilarity; we normalize it as score = 1 − D/(L 1 + L 2 ), where D is the computed edit distance and L i the same as LCS/LCSeq.
Frequency distributions. As mentioned before, frequency distributions are compared using Manhattan distance: M = n i=1 |x i − y i |, score = M/2. Raw and BF n-grams. Since we no longer have full packet content, we instead compute the percentage of common n-grams: score = 2 * N c /(N 1 + N 2 ), where N c is the number of common n-grams and N i the number of suspicious n-grams in alert i. If a Bloom filter is used, a count may be kept with it or approximated by N b /N h , i.e., the number of bits set divided by the number of hash functions used.
Testing with real traffic
To compare the approaches, we randomly sampled HTTP packets from three sources: clean packets collected from www and www1 (two heavily-trafficked Columbia CS webservers), and malicious packets collected from a sample of attacks (CodeRed, CodeRed II, WebDAV, Mirela, a phpBB forum attack, and an IIS buffer overflow (MS03-022) exploit). These packets were paired off in three sets: 10,000 "good-vs-good" pairs from 100 packets of www and www1 traffic each, 1,540 "bad-vs-bad" pairs formed in the cross-product of the 56 packet malicious dataset, and 5,600 "good-vs-bad" pairs of www1 and malicious packets. Similarity scores were generated for all of the resulting pairs with all techniques, except SE, which is too brittle to produce meaningful comparisons, and the n-gram analyses, which cannot be compared over an entire packet. Figure 1 visualizes a small random subset (80 pairs) of the scores generated from the "good-vs-good" source. As figure 1 shows, the performance plots of the methods appear similar, although their centers and scale values differ as the scores are not normalized between the correlation methods. On raw payloads, LCSeq and ED bear very similar results, while comparisons on Z-Strings yield "flatter" results, as less information is compared.
As a more complete experiment, normalized scores were generated and compared for all of the pairs formed amongst the three datasets. To normalize the scores for a comparison, we first compute similarity score vectors V A , V B for the same data over two techniques A and B. The center of the two vectors are then aligned by shifting the median of V A to match V B . Finally, V A 's range is scaled proportionally so that its min and max values match V B 's. This normalization allows us to compute the Manhattan Distance of the two vectors, distance = n i=1 |V Ai − V Bi |; smaller values imply greater similarity between the two methods. Note that these scores are relative and dependent on the data used; the normalized results are only useful for comparing against a baseline, not as a source of absolute values or across datasets. These pairs were tested with each technique, and the resulting scores were normalized against and compared to the LCSeq score over raw packets. Table 1 Averaged over the three scores, Raw-ED is, unsurprisingly, closest to Raw-LCSeq. When privacy-preserving methods are considered, Manhattan distance performs the best overall, and particularly well for good-vs-bad comparison. All of the privacy-preserving methods are close when correlating pairs with attack traffic; we conjecture that significantly different byte distributions enable effective comparison even when some information is lost via privacypreservation.
Cross-Domain Alert Correlation
Next, we compare the techniques by examining their actual performance in identifying true alerts from false positives. Ideally, all false alerts are eliminated by a small similarity score (i.e. the site that produced the alert was the only site that saw this suspicious packet) while true alerts are identified with high similarity scores (i.e. the attack has been launched against more than one site). In this experiment, we first randomly mix the aforementioned collection of attacks into two hours' traffic from www and www1, respectively. Multiple instances of attacks-4 for CodeRed and 3 for CodeRed II-are present to simulate a real-world worm attack. The attacks are also fragmented differently, as CodeRed does in the wild; for instance, CodeRed may fragment into a sequence of (1448, 1448, 1143) length packets, (4, 375, 1460, 1460, 740) length packets, etc. Multiple instances also enable testing correlation between different attack types (e.g., CodeRed vs. CodeRed II).
Next, the two mixed traffic sets are each run through PAYL and Anagram with previously-built models and with the alerting threshold lowered so that 100% of the attacks are detected, but with higher (and comparable) false positive rates. The resulting alert sets are correlated against each other using each of the techniques; the results are summarized in figure 2. For each method, the stacked bar represents correlation results for false positives. The shaded portion of the bar represents the 99.9% percentile similarity score range, while the white represents the worst-case (highest) score; in other words, while the worst-case FP score can be high, the vast majority of false positives score relatively low.
The asterisk-marked ("*") lines represent the range of similarity scores when instances of the same worm are correlated, and the open circle-marked ("o") lines represent scores across CodeRed and CodeRed II-a very simple measure of polymorphism. The other worms, which were inserted without fragmentation, all scored at or near 1, and so are not shown. the privacy-preserving techniques, MD, LCSeq and ED on Z-Strings, and n-gram analysis 4 all perform well. (As intuition may suggest, ZStr-LCS is not particularly effective.) Polymorphic worm detection is far harder-even in the case of CR vs. CRII, only Raw-LCSeq and n-grams achieve promising results. N-gram analysis, in particular, stands out; it produces accurate results and is particularly effective at eliminating false positives, and the use of BFs enables privacy-preservation.
Signature Generation Correlating alerts across sites also enables the possibility of automatic signature generation and deployment, once true alerts are identified. (We can also potentially use the scores computed during similarity comparison as a "confidence" measure in mitigation strategies to determine whether to deploy a signature.) Raw packet-based signatures. Given the ability to share raw alerts, we can exchange the LCS or LCSeq of highly similar packets. This has been the subject of much recent work, is not privacy-preserving, and we do not discuss it further here.
Byte frequency/Z-Strings. Given the first packet of a CodeRed II attack in figure 3 and its byte distribution displayed in figure 4 , we can generate a Z-String by ordering the distribution by most frequent to least and dropping frequency information. Figure 5 shows the first 20 bytes of the generated Z-String for the distribution in figure 4 , with nonprintable characters shown by their ASCII values. Both frequency distributions and Z-Strings can be used as signatures.
N-Grams. N-grams are an intriguing approach to signature generation; n-grams are position-independent, making them robust to reordering and fragmentation. Additionally, if position information is kept, such a collection can be transformed into a flat signature if desired. Figure 6 shows the results when a collection of 5-grams based on the GET./default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090 %u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801% u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u 00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u0 CodeRed II example packet are "flattened". Nonprintable characters are represented by "."; "*" represents a wildcard for signature matching. Compared to the original, figure 6 successfully captures the malicious encoding and deemphasizes the padding "noise". Results with different n-gram sizes and another CRII packet are presented in an appendix in the extended version of this paper on our website [6] .
Worminator/Whirlpool

Architecture
We adopt two mechanisms in order to cope with the difficulties of distributed correlation and the potential volume of data being correlated. First, the construction of Bloom filters by Worminator is employed to protect the confidentiality of the data being exchanged between domains. Second, efficient information exchange is accomplished with a distributed correlation scheduling algorithm. The scheduling algorithm dynamically calculates subsets of correlation peers that should communicate to exchange Bloom filters. Since information is also compacted by the Bloom filter, correlation between peers becomes extremely cost-effective in terms of bandwidth and processing power.
Requirements
1. The exchange of alert information must not leak potentially sensitive data. 2. Large alert rates hide stealthy activity; any reasonable solution must deal with or reduce the effects of these rates. 3. Centralized repositories are single points of failure and likely unable to correlate the burgeoning amount of alerts. 4. Exchanging alerts in a full mesh quadratically increases the complexity of the problem. 5. Any solution that partitions data among nodes risks information loss by disassociating evidence that should be considered in the same context.
We make several assumptions about the environment the system exists in and the alert information the system exchanges. Our assumptions and choices are intended to carefully balance the requirements of data privacy with the need to derive useful information and actionable intelligence from the alert exchange. The environment and user base for a collaborative distributed intrusion detection system is an important consideration. We envision cohorts of 25 to 100 organizations exchanging information. Such cohorts can be organizations with similar interests, such as universities, financial institutions, military or government networks, energy companies, news organizations, etc.
The sheer volume of alert streams is a critical consideration in the design and evaluation of any distributed intrusion detection system. The size of current (and foreseeable) alert streams demands low-cost processing and correlation. Alert streams can threaten to dominate network bandwidth if they are unnecessarily replicated.
Perhaps the most important decision we make is to employ the use of "watchlists," or lists of IP addresses suspected of subversive behavior. The task of the distributed detection system is not to analyze the network or host events of other domains, but rather to correlate summaries of alerts to identify attackers. Therefore, watchlists encapsulate the appropriate information to exchange.
Preserving Privacy While IDS alerts themselves could be distributed, there are two substantial disadvantages to doing this: first, organizations may have privacy policies or concerns about sharing detailed IP data, some of which might uncover who they normally communicate with. Second, these alert files grow rapidly given substantial traffic. While parameters may be tweaked to reduce potential noise, a preferable solution would be to encode the relevant information in a compact yet useful manner.
We provide a compact format via the use of Bloom filters. A Bloom filter is a one-way data structure that supports two operations: insertion and verification, e.g., while no data can be extracted after being inserted in the Bloom filter, it is probabilistically possible to see if specific data has been inserted if presented a second time to the Bloom filter. This is accomplished by creating a compact bit vector (typically between 2
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-2 20 entries). Entries are indexed by the hash of the original data, i.e., a high-quality hash of original data (in this case, IPs and port information) is generated, broken up into parts, and these parts are used as indices into the bit vector. Each resolved index in the bit vector is set to 1. This process is typically repeated multiple times (for different parts of the hash and/or different hashes), thereby increasing resiliency to noise or data saturation. Verification is similar to insertion; instead of actually setting bits, the bit vector is examined to determine if the bits are already set. Therefore, the IDS parses its alert output and generates Bloom filters corresponding to (for example) IP/port endpoint data.
Since Bloom filters are compact one-way data structures, we get three benefits:
-Compactness: A Bloom filter smaller than 10k bits in size is still able to accurately verify tens of thousands of entries.
-Resiliency, even when the Bloom filter is decreased in size: When the Bloom filter is saturated, it starts giving false positives (i.e., multiple data entries resolve to the same locations in the bit vector), but never gives false negatives. The false positives can be ameliorated by tuning or by correlation against multiple alert lists.
* /def*ult.ida?XXXX*XXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3% u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%u cbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8 b00%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a HT*: 3379 Fig. 6 . Generated 5-gram signature from the CRII packet; only the first 172 bytes are shown for brevity.
-Security: By utilizing a one-way data structure, organizations can correlate watchlists without releasing actual IP data, satisfying privacy needs while being able to participate. If further security from outside observers is needed, the dissemination protocol can be encapsulated in a secure tunnel, like SSL, thereby only granting Bloom filter access to the set of participants in the alert list correlation.
Distributed Correlation A distributed correlation function must overcome the problems of a centralized model while balancing the information loss inherent in partitioning alert data among different nodes. The most straightforward way to accomplish distribution (forwarding all data from every node to every other node) involves a quadratic increase in the amount of data exchanged. More sophisticated approaches are based on two different theories. The first approach, which mirrors traditional DHT-based P2P networks, creates an explicit mapping from alert data (specifically, source and target IP addresses) to particular correlation nodes. The reasoning behind this approach is that source and target IP addresses are the two most important features (besides target port) of alert data. With data about various machines collected in one node, the majority of correlation can be accomplished at that node without communicating with other nodes (except to distribute results of global interest).
The shortcoming of this approach is that nodes become special cases of the centralized model: they are single points of failure for information pertaining to the IP address range being hashed. In addition, participants in the system may be uncomfortable with storing their raw alert information at a single node. This approach invests too much trust in each node. While a self-healing approach like Chord [10] can ameliorate the loss of a node, previous information stored at that node is at best lost temporarily (for example, in the case of a denial of service,) or corrupted (in the case of the node being compromised). Some of these shortcomings can be mitigated by replicating the data to some number of other nodes; however, it is not clear what the appropriate balance is between fault-tolerance through replication and utilization of network bandwidth and storage space. If data is replicated to every other node, we see an unacceptable quadratic increase in the cost of the system. Furthermore, while DHT-based overlays provide a fast lookup() operation, the performance of such networks under churn (rapid series of join() and leave() operations) is questionable [3] .
The second theory attempts to address the limitations of the first approach by introducing a dynamic mapping between nodes and content. This dynamic overlay network (as opposed to the largely static mappings of traditional DHT-based overlay networks) implicitly incorporates the notion of churn and does not need to spend time rebuilding neighbor (finger) tables. We observe that a theoretical optimal schedule exists for communicating information. If an oracle existed in the network that answered with the appropriate subset of nodes that should talk given a particular alert, links could be established between these nodes without talking to nodes with irrelevant data (e.g., without a lookup() operation).
In this model, we assume that there is a set of nodes S of size N . We assume that there is some reliable mechanism for any subset of nodes to communicate with each other. There is some discrete unit of knowledge K, that if known would provide evidence of a distributed scan. During a distributed scan, some subset of S is scanned and now contains a piece of knowledge K i .
Normally, this knowledge would be discarded as insignificant. However, the optimal schedule allows this set of nodes to perfectly guess which of its neighbors also contains a piece of K. Note that each node could also find this information out via the O(N 2 ) full mesh method of asking each other node in the network. However, we assert that this method is too costly in terms of trust, network bandwidth, and disk storage.
The key idea in this optimal schedule is that the correct subsets of nodes are always communicating. In order to mimic this behavior, the (approximately) correct nodes must talk to each other at (approximately) the right time. One way of accomplishing such a schedule is to pick relationships at random. Another way is to employ a publish-subscribe scheme.
Whirlpool: Network Scheduling
There is a clear need for efficient alert correlation in large-scale distributed networks. To address this need, we introduce the notion of network scheduling: the controllable formation and dissolution of relationships between nodes and groups of nodes in a network. These relationships can be envisioned as a dynamic overlay. Our network scheduling mechanism is a procedure for coordinating the exchange of information between the members of a correlation group. The mechanism is controlled by a dynamic and parameterizable correlation schedule.
Our approach is predicated on the previously described theoretical model of the optimal correlation schedule, the shortcomings of a fully interconnected mesh of correlation nodes, and the limitations of the ideal centralized approach to large-scale correlation. The main difficulty is that nodes would most likely discard data that in truth belong to a distributed alert. We must develop a mechanism whereby a node can quickly conference with other peers and determine whether or not a local alert is noise or signifies part of a distributed alert.
The basic architecture of network scheduling is a set of dynamic federations. Nodes that join and leave these federations at various rates. The variance in rates is intended to allow federation groups to retain some stability while expediting the import of new information into the group. Furthermore, this mechanism can be augmented with a distributed learning algorithm that assists in promoting alerts discovered by the distributed correlation.
Implementation
Worminator The Worminator platform supports compact watchlist correlation via the replication and use of Bloom filters [1] and uses the Antura network intrusion detection system [8] to generate alerts. The Antura NIDS has been demonstrated to be an order-of-magnitude better at detecting long-term stealthy scans than competing products.
Our initial proof-of-concept version of Worminator ran at specific intervals on the computer running the Antura sensor, parsed its alert output, and generated Bloom filters corresponding to IP/port endpoint data. These alerts were then transmitted to a centralized node using HTTP, and correlation was manually initiated after-the-fact by downloading these Bloom filters from the centralized node. This proof-of-concept prototype demonstrated the feasibility of the idea: in preliminary tests that correlated results from installations of Worminator at two academic sites, three common sources of stealthy surveillance were detected: one each in Beijing, the Phillippines, and a small western US community college. These sources are most probably interested in the test sites to discover weakly protected (but usually more powerful and better connected) university or research machines.
We have since evolved this version to better handle communication latency and privacy requirements. The current version of Worminator is completely pluggable, and supports different sensor and alert types, correlators, and communication frameworks. Just as importantly, it supports continuous validation; alerts from the sensor are exchanged immediately, and correlation runs real-time to glean data as soon as possible to help prepare defenses against pending attacks or fast-moving worms.
The goal is to enable sites to maintain a secure watchlist of alerts seen locally and from other sites, and to generate a warnlist of significant threats if they have been correlated as having been seen at multiple sites. This warnlist can then be reported to network administrators or could be directly mapped to firewall rules to prevent impending attacks. Depending on privacy policies, these local warnlists may also be explicitly replicated to other sites to enable a fast global-scale response.
Worminator consists of approximately 9,500 lines of Java code, and leverages a number of J2EE (Java 2 Enterprise Edition) providers, including the PostgreSQL JDBC provider (for querying databases), the Tomcat JSP/Servlet container (for the user interface), and the JBossMQ JMS provider (for event transport).
Results
Worminator collaborative site experiment The new version of Worminator was deployed at four different sites in the Northeast: two at Columbia (one on the perimeter of the Computer Science network and the other on the perimeter of a campus dorm), one at a company in midtown Manhattan, and the last a research institution in Washington, D.C. The Antura sensor was used as the source of alerts at each site, and Java Message Service, a publish-subscribe communication infrastructure, was leveraged to support event distribution amongst the sites. This configuration was run for approximately 96 hours. Information on source IPs and scan times were exchanged.
During the time, approximately 550,000 alerts were generated and exchanged. By far the most of these alerts (roughly 75%) were at the Computer Science network. In addition to traffic passing through the perimeter of the CS network, the CS sensor sees internal traffic between CS machines. (Ordinarily, the dorm network might be more saturated with malicious traffic, but this data was taken during Spring Break, when many undergraduates leave campus. The dorm sensor was also deployed later than the other sites, and had run for approximately two days.) As Figure 7 implies, IPs generated more than one alert in some instances; nevertheless, the number of IPs is very large for each site, making individual alerting difficult. A total of 29,731 unique IPs were seen. Next, we ran queries to determine which sources were seen at two, three, or four sites. The reduction by examining the set of common sources is remarkable -only 18 of the 29,731 original source IPs were observed at three sites. While this does not necessarily discount the other 29,713 IPs, the likelihood that legitimate traffic exists between three of these four unrelated sites is extremely low, and simple port analysis can help confirm this hypothesis. Note that, due to reduced activity at the dorm site, conclusions about the number of common sources at all four sites is preliminary at best, but the one site that matched originated from China. Further analysis from the CS sensor revealed that the machine was probing destination ports 1026 and 1027 -used by the Windows Messenger service [4] , strongly suggesting this IP was doing wholesale "pop-up" Internet spamming. While its activity may have been benign, such a source is clearly indicative of undesirable traffic, and leveraging the warnlist makes it easy to block such sources, be it undesirable or outright malicious.
# of sites # common src IPs % reduction
We also performed some preliminary analysis on the two-site data to determine if a significant geographic distribution existed (e.g., if more scans originated from any particular site). Figure 9 illustrates the results of the top eight countries (which comprise 87% of the total scans -every other country contributed two or less IPs to the overall total).
As the chart shows, China dominates, with nearly 49% of the top eight countries and 41% overall amongst all countries. This suggests that, despite the "great firewall of China", outbound scans and probes are unaffected and continue to propagate to a broad cross-section of the Internet.
One interesting footnote: while performing analysis on the two-site data, two alerts were generated for the IP 128.9.168.45. Reverse DNS revealed the URL to be http://ptr.isi.edu, which turns out to be an Internet mapping server performing "low-volume" scans. Indeed, this source comprised only .00007% of the total alert exchange, yet we were able to focus on the source with a minimum of effort. This analysis only scratches the tip of the iceberg; it becomes clear, however, that useful data can easily be gleaned with just a few sites exchanging alerts. We plan to increase the number of participating sites, which will greatly increase the depth and breadth of the types of sources of surveillance and we expect it to further validate our approach.
Alert Rates Intrusion detection systems face the very real threat of information loss from the sheer rate of available information. Schaelicke et al. [9] are decidedly pessimistic about the ability of relatively powerful commodity hardware and network links to absorb peak alert loads, noting that an IDS is effectively neutralized by the loss of alert data resulting from a database unable to keep up with incoming network data. This problem is compounded if multiple NIDS sensors report to the same database system. DShield reports about 10 million alert records added daily. Event reduction and aggregation is a critical part of our system. Since we construct watchlists from very little information (an IP address and a port), we are interested in ways of combining different alert information. Reduction can be accomplished by filtering events either at the source sensor or prior to correlation processing. As a trivial example of the latter, consider a series of 100 basic IDS alerts with the same source and destination IP information and alert type information (e.g., "Host X probed host Y on port Z"). These alerts can be reduced to a single alert and a frequency. If a significant portion of alert streams are amenable to this type of reduction, we can either perform more expensive processing on the resulting stream, or produce actionable intelligence more rapidly. Inexpensive reduction strategies (like logically grouping attacking IP source addresses in the same /24 subnet) can result in substantial compression, as is aggregation of multiple scan alerts (one per port) by a single source into one overall alert announcing a scan. For an example of the successful application of these reduction strategies, Network Schedule Evaluation To evaluate the effectiveness of the Whirlpool network scheduling, we compare it against a full mesh distribution scheme and a random selection distribution scheme. To that end, we introduce a Bandwidth Effective Utilization Metric (BEUM). The BEUM is defined as:
where t is the average number of time units it takes the distribution scheme to detect an attack and B is the amount of bandwidth used by the distribution mechanism during that period. B is defined in terms of the total number of nodes, N , communicating via the distribution mechanism. Thus, for a full mesh scheme we have:
and the time to discover an attack is t = 1. The BEUM for a full mesh distribution strategy is therefore 1 N * (N −1) . For a system of 100 nodes, the BEUM for a full mesh is 1 9900
The BEUM for a particular schedule where groups are kept at roughly √ N is different and based on the calculation of the bandwidth consumed, B:
In general, if t ≤ √ N , this particular schedule wins. Specifically, for a system of 100 nodes, the BEUM is 1 1000t . If t ≤ 9, this schedule is a better choice than a full mesh. Many other schedules are possible to balance the tradeoffs between bandwidth, coverage, and latency and we are exploring methods for identifying optimal schedules given a set of constraints.
We simulated a randomized scheduling strategy for a system of 100 nodes (performed over 1000 trials). Our simulations indicate that on average, it takes 6 time units before an attack is detected using a repeated random schedule. This time unit requirement satisfies the requirement for t ≤ 10 we derived for the BEUM. Figure 11 shows that even though some pathological outliers exist, the vast majority of attacks are detected in a relatively short time. 
Longitudinal Study of Scan Behavior
This study of stealthy scan behavior is designed to demonstrate the proposed Worminator hypothesis, that collaborative intrusion detection not only enables detection of worm spread but also scanning behavior as precursors to an attack. There are three key longitudes for analysis:
1. Over time: as it is difficult to determine ahead of time when a widespread worm attack will occur, the goal here is not necessarily to correlate certain scan behavior with particular attack behavior scanners who try to "fly under the radar" by throttling their scanning rates at any individual site to as little as a few scans per day per IP. One can define a measure of stealthiness by looking at scan time windows, both on a local (single-site) and on a global (many-site) basis. 2. Over geographical and network space: a clever attacker is unlikely to focus all their scanning efforts from a single source; instead, the current trend is to spread scan efforts over a broad range of sources, and to leverage those sources as a proxy to mask scanning behavior. Botnets ( [5] , [7] ) are also becoming an increasingly common tool for scans. By leveraging collaboration, the goal is to observe a wider destination space to ease detection of broader networks of coordinated scanners. 3. By target: one key form of anonymity described in this thesis is that of anonymous but categorizable. This allows for the exploration of targeted scans, e.g., sources that scan particular categories of networks but skip others. Here, we compute aggregate statistics on the popularity of commercial vs. academic targets, etc. As of the writing of this thesis, only two commercial sites have been deployed, so the results of this experiment are limited.
Scan Lengths and Stealthiness
As the Worminator system was design to observe long-term scanning behavior, the first question of relevance is the actual scan behavior of sources, especially those who are observed at multiple sites. Table 2 shows aggregate scan length results for sources (site/IPs, not site/IP/destination tuples) appearing at exactly 1 through 5 sites, in days, e.g. source IPs seen at four sites were observed, on average, for a period of about 30 days. Table 2 . Maximum and average scan lengths for 1-5 sites, by source IP/site, in days.
The conclusion is clear: sources which are observed at multiple sites tend to scan for longer periods. The most likely explanation for this behavior at the small scale is the elimination of false positives; source IPs that are seen at two or three sites often eliminate the local false alerts that IDSes typically observe. On the other hand, the dramatic increase in average for 5 sites is interesting. Figure 12 shows a time plot of the scan lengths for sources that scanned 5 sites.
This suggests that, indeed, many 5-site-scanners were long-term, and that the high standard deviation is primarily due to the limited length of the experiment (and the fact that not all sites were up for extended periods of time). Unfortunately, conclusive results cannot be drawn from the small sample set, but still, the noticeably higher average scan time suggests that many of these sources are long-term broad scanners-and that corroboration helps to identify them.
These results do not take volume into account, however. In particular, if a scanner happens to be a machine that aggressively scans all of its targets, that's more easily detectable without corroboration. Of greater concern are scanning sources that only generate a few alerts at each site over a long period of time. These scanners essentially fly under the radar by hiding behind all the noise generated at individual sites. By corroborating and looking for the slowest scanners over long periods of time, we can find, without difficulty, entities who are looking to do significant machine mapping.
To do this, we define a "stealthiness" metric St for any arbitrary source s i , total scanning time t i and number of alerts |a| i :
Low stealthiness levels amongst scanners at multiple sites is of particular interest; tables 3 and 4 show the top-10 stealthiest scanners detected across 4 and 5 sites, respectively. As can be observed, there are scanners that issue only a few scans per site over the course of a year. Even more interesting are the italicized entries-these are scanners from the same subnet! A quick lookup on that /24 yields the results in table 5. ev1 is a major ISP in the United States, and this may have been the IP space of one "customer" (be it a legitimate customer whose machines were subverted against their knowledge, or an illegitimate customer using the machines as a scanning source). The likelihood that these hosts were legitimately present at 5 disparate sites is extremely unlikely, especially since several of the sites have absolutely no relationship with each other (excepting this study; however, no Columbia IPs are listed above).
Further discussion about subnet analysis can be found later in this subsection.
Breadth and (Loud) Volume
As a counterpart to the previous subsection, Worminator should also ideally be able to identify the noisy sources-to enable, for example, evidence of an active attack. There are various ways to establish a noisy source, including: the aforementioned stealthiness metric can be used to determine the least stealthy source; the number of alerts generated by the IDS may also serve as an indicator, regardless of scan length; and the number of sites a source appears at. Figures 6-14 show the noisiest sources at 4 and 5 sites using the stealthiness and alert count metric, respectively. The results shown here, especially the ones by stealthiness, are remarkable; for example, the top noisiest source issued 331 alerts scattered amongst 5 sites over the space of two days; a quick port analysis yields that all of these were to port 22 (ssh), suggesting a brute-force password attack against ssh servers. Moreover, a number of IPs in 61.152.* appear in the top 10 by both noise metrics. Of particular note was 61.152.158.109, which generated nearly 2,000 alerts over the stretch of three months at all five sources. A quick port analysis yields that these scan alerts were distributed across ports 1026-1030, which is indicative of a Windows Messenger spammer. (As mentioned before, active large-scale worm attacks were not observed during this period, but one can construe a UDP spammer as an attacker, as scanning behavior will likely be similar.) Given such metrics, a simple thresholding may enable automatic response with high confidence, which is ultimately what is desired during an actual attack. Therefore, in addition to determining stealthy scanners, we can also identify active attackers, to enable a comprehensive two-pronged approach.
Geographic Analysis
Given multiple-site corroboration, we can do some analysis to see if there is any correlation between multiple-site scanners and geographic tendencies, by both the number of scanning sources and the number of alerts generated by IDS sensors. A combination of DNS and WHOIS data was used to determine the geographic distribution of IP addresses. Figures 15-19 show the results of this analysis. The country codes shown are the ISO codes used by WHOIS. Countries with less than 1% of alerts or IPs are not shown, and are instead lumped into "Other". Source The trend from 1-site to 4-site is clear: as more sites' alerts are corroborated, the geographic distribution takes an increasingly international bent; most notable is the shift from the US being the primary source of alerts to China. Part of this is due to the fact that corroboration eliminates most of the false positives observed at local networks; for example, most false positives in CUCS would be attributable to machines on the same LAN. This is already visible in the second chart in figure 15 , where the US actually has significantly more alerts than actual IP space. By the time 4-site scanners are counted, China has 45% of total alerts and 51% of IP addresses. 5-site scanners are somewhat of an anomaly to this trend. However, the 5-site dataset is small, and it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions from it. Further study is required to see how this trend continues when more sites are included (although it should be noted that Russia seems to have a significant presence amongst 5-site scanners). What remains clear is that the largest source of scan behavior emanates, by far, from two primary countries. This also suggests that, despite the "great firewall of China", outbound scans and probes are unaffected and continue to propagate to a broad cross-section of the Internet.
Scanning Subnets
As mentioned earlier, the presence of multiple scanners within the same subnet may be indicative of a coordinated scan or attack, which may be of greater interest especially if multiple sites have seen the same behavior. To evaluate this, a scan was made through the IP addresses collected through the IDS to see if any interesting outlier class C subnets (i.e., /24s) were found. To make this more accurate, the "number of sites" criterion was modified to act as a lower bound, since not all addresses may have been detected at all sites. Table 8 shows the aggregate statistics for subnet scanners.
On average, very few IPs (≈ 1 − 2) are found to be scanners within any given subnet. This would imply that a subnet with 115 scanners detected on at least two sites is a significant anomaly-60 standard deviations above the mean, to be precise! To get a better feel of the outlier distribution of scanning subnets, figure 20 shows a logarithmic graph of the largest subnets varying with the minimum number of sites the scanners are detected upon. While all of the variations show a "long tail", as more sites are involved the "head" of the tail becomes a larger outlier. While the possibility remains that these IPs were independent and coincidentally happened to be many active blocks in the same class C, the statistics make this extremely unlikely. It is worth mentioning that newer scanning botnets are not necessarily restricted to single subnets; indeed, many of the newer scanning approaches use a much broader range of machines, such as compromised computers distributed across the Internet.
Target Analysis
One last significant form of analysis is looking for alerts that correspond to certain target longitudes, i.e., scanners that may target commercial institutions but not academic institutions, or vice-versa. These may be indicative of scan sources that are more than just purely automated-they may be actively scanning some entities and not others to build more specific hitlists.
Given our collected data, a total of 2,095 sources matched these criteria; 311 sources targeted all three academic institutions but neither of the two commercial ones, while 1,784 sources targeted both commercial institutions but none of the three academic sites. Tables 9-12 show the top 10 for each, measured by number of alerts and stealthiness, respectively, along with the top ports for the sources in question. A number of these correspond to well-known services; a list of ports and their corresponding services can be obtained from /etc/services for any unix system or from IANA http://www.iana.org/assignments/port-numbers.
What these four tables make clear is that there are both categories of targeted scanners-those that issue many scan attempts against specific sites, and those that issue as few attempts as possible. The latter make intuitive sense; the former, however, are more unusual; if a scanner is going to generate so many reports against disparate organizations, why would they not broadly scan other networks? One might chalk it up to coincidence, although the volume of the outliers (on the order of thousands of alerts) and scan length suggests that it is more than a coincidence. Additionally, we can note that these scanners appear to be targeting different services across domains. For instance, academic sites seem to be more targeted for Messenger (port 1026) spam, while commercial sites seem to be targeted more for SQL vulnerabilities (port 1434); while both are discussed in greater detail in the next subsection, there may be both pragmatic and topological considerations behind these results.
In general, this form of analysis needs longer periods and broader data collection; ideally, such collection would enable analysis per industry or segments of industry, instead of the current rough-granular academic vs. commercial. Nevertheless, the results above show promise in this form of analysis.
